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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
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Look-alike
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WIKIMAG n. 7 - Giugno 2013
Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA)
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- Togli il segno di spunta per disattivarla
The entrance of the CIA New Headquarters Building (NHB) of
the George Bush Center for Intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is one of the
principal
intelligence-gathering agencies of the
United States federal government. An executive agency, it reports to
the
Director of National Intelligence.[7]
The CIA has three principal activities: gathering information about
foreign governments, corporations, and individuals; analyzing that
information, along with intelligence gathered by other U.S. intelligence
agencies, in order to provide
national security
intelligence assessment to senior United States
policymakers; and, upon the request of the President of the United
States, carrying out or overseeing
covert activities and some tactical operations by its own employees,
by members of the U.S. military, or by other partners.[8][9]
[10][11][12]
It can, for example, exert foreign political influence through its
tactical divisions, such as the
Special Activities Division.[13]
The CIA's
headquarters is in
Langley, Virginia, a few miles west of Washington, D.C.[14]
Its employees operate from U.S. embassies and many other locations
around the world.[15][16]
The CIA succeeded the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), formed during
World War II to coordinate secret espionage activities against the
Axis Powers for the branches of the
United States Armed Forces. The
National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA, affording it "no
police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad".[17][18]
There has been considerable criticism of the CIA relating to security
and counterintelligence failures, failures in intelligence analysis,
human rights concerns, external investigations and document releases,
influencing public opinion and law enforcement, drug trafficking, and
lying to Congress.[19]
Others, such as
Eastern bloc defector
Ion Mihai Pacepa, have defended the CIA as "by far the world’s best
intelligence organization," and argued that CIA activities are subjected
to scrutiny unprecedented among the world's intelligence agencies.[20]
Organizational structure
Chart showing the organization of the Central Intelligence
Agency./
The CIA has an executive office and several agency-wide functions,
and four major directorates:
- The Directorate of Intelligence, responsible for
all-source intelligence research and analysis
- The
National Clandestine Service, formerly the Directorate of
Operations, which does clandestine intelligence collection and
covert action
- The Directorate of Support
- The Directorate of Science and Technology
Executive Office
The
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) reports directly
to the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI); in practice, he deals with
the DNI, Congress (usually via the
Office of Congressional Affairs), and the
White House, while the Deputy Director is the internal executive.
The CIA has varying amounts of Congressional oversight, although that is
principally a guidance role.
The Executive Office also facilitates the CIA's support of the
U.S. military by providing it with information it gathers, receiving
information from
military intelligence organizations, and cooperating on field
activities. Two senior executives have responsibility, one CIA-wide and
one for the
National Clandestine Service. The Associate Director for Military
Support, a senior military officer, manages the relationship between the
CIA and the
Unified Combatant Commands, who produce regional/operational
intelligence and consume national intelligence; he is assisted by the
Office of Military Affairs in providing support to all branches of
the military.[21]
In the National Clandestine Services, an Associate Deputy Director
for Operations for Military Affairs[22]
deals with specific
clandestine human-source intelligence and covert action in support
of military operations.
The CIA also makes national-level intelligence available to tactical
organizations, usually to their all-source intelligence group.[23]
Executive staff
Staff offices with several general responsibilities report to the
Executive Office. The staff also gather information and then report such
information to the Executive Office.
General
publications
The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence maintains the Agency's
historical materials and promotes the study of intelligence as a
legitimate discipline.[24]
In 2002, the CIA's
School for Intelligence Analysis began publishing the unclassified
Kent Center Occasional Papers, aiming to offer "an opportunity
for intelligence professionals and interested colleagues—in an
unofficial and unfettered vehicle—to debate and advance the theory and
practice of intelligence analysis."[25]
General Counsel and Inspector General
Two offices advise the Director on legality and proper operations.
The Office of General Counsel advises the Director of the CIA on all
legal matters relating to his role as CIA director and is the principal
source of legal counsel for the CIA.
The
Office of Inspector General promotes efficiency, effectiveness, and
accountability in the administration of Agency activities, and seeks to
prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The Inspector
General, whose activities are independent of those of any other
component in the Agency, reports directly to the Director of the CIA.[26][27]
Influencing public opinion
The Office of Public Affairs is often in charge of creating state
funded propaganda for the masses. Such as the 9/11 counter terror
administration advises the Director of the CIA on all media, public
policy, and employee communications issues relating to this person's
role. This office, among other functions, works with the
entertainment industry.[28]
Directorate of Intelligence
The Directorate of Intelligence produces all-source
intelligence investigation on key foreign and intercontenital issues
relating to powerful and sometimes anti-government sensitive topics.[29]
It has four regional analytic groups, six groups for transnational
issues, and two support units.[30]
Regional groups
There is an Office dedicated to
Iraq, and
regional analytical Offices covering:
Transnational
groups
The Office of Terrorism Analysis[31]
supports the National Counterterrorism Center in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. See
CIA transnational anti-terrorism activities.[32]
The Office of Transnational Issues[33]
assesses perceived existing and emerging threats to US national security
and provides the most senior policymakers, military planners, and law
enforcement with analysis, warning, and crisis support.
The CIA Crime and Narcotics Center[34]
researches information on international crime for policymakers and the
law enforcement community. As the CIA has no legal domestic police
authority, it usually sends its analyses to the FBI and other law
enforcement organizations, such as the
Drug Enforcement Administration and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
The Weapons Intelligence,
Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center[35]
provides intelligence support related to national and non-national
threats, as well as supporting threat reduction and arms control. It
receives the output of
national technical means of verification.
The Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group[36]
identifies, monitors, and analyzes the efforts of foreign intelligence
entities, both national and non-national, against US government
interests. It works with FBI personnel in the National
Counterintelligence Executive of the Director of National Intelligence.
The Information Operations Center Analysis Group.[37]
deals with threats to US computer systems. This unit supports DNI
activities.
Support and
general units
The Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis provides
comprehensive intelligence collection expertise to the Directorate of
Intelligence, to senior Agency and Intelligence Community officials, and
to key national policymakers.
The Office of Policy Support customizes Directorate of
Intelligence analysis and presents it to a wide variety of policy, law
enforcement, military, and foreign liaison recipients.
National
Clandestine Service
The National Clandestine Service (NCS; formerly the
Directorate of Operations) is responsible for collecting foreign
intelligence, mainly from clandestine HUMINT sources, and covert action.
The new name reflects its role as the coordinator of human intelligence
activities among other elements of the wider U.S. intelligence community
with their own HUMINT operations. The NCS was created in an attempt to
end years of rivalry over influence, philosophy and budget between the
United States Department of Defense and the CIA. In spite of this,
the Department of Defense recently organized its own global clandestine
intelligence service, the
Defense Clandestine Service,[38]
under the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
The precise present organization of the NCS is classified.[39]
Directorate of Science and Technology
The Directorate of Science & Technology was established to research,
create, and manage technical collection disciplines and equipment. Many
of its innovations were transferred to other intelligence organizations,
or, as they became more overt, to the military services.
For example, the development of the
U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was done in cooperation
with the
United States Air Force. The U-2's original mission was clandestine
imagery intelligence over denied areas such as the
Soviet Union.[40]
It was subsequently provided with
signals intelligence and
measurement and signature intelligence capabilities, and is now
operated by the Air Force.
Imagery intelligence collected by the U-2 and reconnaissance
satellites was analyzed by a DS&T organization called the National
Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), which had analysts from both the CIA
and the military services. Subsequently, NPIC was transferred to the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
The CIA has always shown a strong interest in how to use advances in
technology to enhance its effectiveness. This interest has historically
had two primary goals:
- harnessing techniques for its own use
- countering any new intelligence technologies the Soviets might
develop.[41]
In 1999, the CIA created the
venture capital firm
In-Q-Tel to help fund and develop technologies of interest to the
agency.[42]
It has long been the IC practice to contract for major development, such
as reconnaissance aircraft and satellites.
Directorate of
Support
The Directorate of Support has organizational and administrative
functions to significant units including:
- The Office of Security
- The Office of Communications
- The Office of Information Technology
Training
The Office of Training begins with the Junior Officer Training
program for new employees before going on to conducting courses in a
wide range of specialized professional disciplines. So that the initial
course might be taken by employees who had not received final security
clearance and thus were not permitted unescorted access to the
Headquarters building, a good deal of basic training has been given at
office buildings in the urban areas of Arlington, Virginia.
For later stage of training of student operations officers, there is
at least one classified training area at
Camp Peary, near
Williamsburg, Virginia. Students are selected, and their progress
evaluated, in ways derived from the OSS, published as the book
Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic
Services.[43]
Budget
The overall U.S. intelligence budget has been considered classified
until recently. There have been numerous attempts to obtain general
information about the budget.[44]
As a result, it was revealed that CIA's annual budget in Fiscal Year
1963 was US $550 million (inflation-adjusted US$ 4.1 billion in 2013),[45]
and the overall intelligence budget in FY 1997 was US $26.6 billion
(inflation-adjusted US$ 38 billion in 2013).[46]
There have also been accidental disclosures; for instance,
Mary Margaret Graham, a former CIA official and deputy director of
national intelligence for collection in 2005, said that the annual
intelligence budget was $44 billion.[47]
In
Legacy of Ashes-The History of the CIA,
Tim
Weiner claims that early funding was solicited by
James Forrestal and
Allen Dulles from private
Wall Street and Washington, D.C. sources. Next Forrestal convinced
"an old chum,"
John W. Snyder, the
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and one of Truman's closest allies,
to allow the use of the $200 million
Exchange Stabilization Fund by CIA fronts to influence European
elections, beginning with
Italy.[48]
After the
Marshall Plan was approved, appropriating $13.7 billion over five
years, 5% of those funds or $685 million were made available to the CIA.[49]
Relationship with other intelligence agencies
The CIA acts as the primary US HUMINT, human intelligence, and
general analytic agency, under the
Director of National Intelligence, who directs or coordinates the 16
member organizations of the
United States Intelligence Community. In addition, it obtains
information from other U.S. government intelligence agencies, commercial
information sources, and foreign intelligence services.[citation
needed]
Other U.S.
agencies
A number of intelligence organizations are fully or partially under
the budgetary control of the
United States Secretary of Defense or other cabinet officers such as
the
United States Attorney General.[citation
needed]
As do other analytic members of the U.S. intelligence community, such
as the Department of State's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the analytic division of the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the CIA's raw input includes
imagery intelligence (IMINT) collected by the air and space systems of
the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), processed by the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), signals intelligence
(SIGINT) of the
National Security Agency (NSA), and measurement and signature
intelligence (MASINT) from the DIA MASINT center.[citation
needed]
Foreign
intelligence services
The role and functions of the CIA are roughly equivalent to those of
the United Kingdom's
Secret Intelligence Service (the SIS or MI6,), the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the
Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS),the Egyptian
Inelligence agency,the
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki)
(SVR), the Indian
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Pakistani
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the French foreign intelligence
service
Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) and Israel's
Mossad.
While the preceding agencies both collect and analyze information, some
like the U.S. State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research are purely analytical agencies.[citation
needed]
The closest links of the U.S. IC to other foreign intelligence
agencies are to Anglophone countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom. There is a special communications marking that
signals that intelligence-related messages can be shared with these four
countries.[50]
An indication of the United States' close operational cooperation is the
creation of a new message distribution label within the main U.S.
military communications network. Previously, the marking of NOFORN
(i.e., No Foreign Nationals) required the originator to specify which,
if any, non-U.S. countries could receive the information. A new handling
caveat, USA/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL Five Eyes, used primarily on
intelligence messages, gives an easier way to indicate that the material
can be shared with Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand.
The task of the division called "Verbindungsstelle 61" of the German
Bundesnachrichtendienst is keeping contact to the CIA office in
Wiesbaden.[51]
History
The Central Intelligence Agency was created by Congress with the
passage of the
National Security Act of 1947, signed into law by President
Harry S. Truman. Its creation was inspired by the successes of the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) of World War II, which was
dissolved in October 1945 and its functions transferred to the State and
War Departments. Eleven months earlier, in 1944,
William J. Donovan, the OSS's creator, proposed to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to create a new organization directly
supervised by the President: "which will procure intelligence both by
overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence
guidance, determine national intelligence objectives, and correlate the
intelligence material collected by all government agencies."[52]
Under his plan, a powerful, centralized civilian agency would have
coordinated all the intelligence services. He also proposed that this
agency have authority to conduct "subversive operations abroad," but "no
police or law enforcement functions, either at home or abroad."[53]
The lives of 102 fallen CIA officers are represented by 102
stars on the
CIA Memorial Wall in the Original Headquarters building.
Immediate predecessors, 1946–47
The Office of Strategic Services, which was the first independent
U.S. intelligence agency, created for World War II, was broken up
shortly after the end of the war, by President Harry S. Truman, on
September 20, 1945 when he signed an
Executive Order which made the breakup 'official' as of October 1,
1945. The rapid reorganizations that followed reflected the routine sort
of bureaucratic competition for resources, but also trying to deal with
the proper relationships of clandestine intelligence collection and
covert action (i.e., paramilitary and psychological operations). In
October 1945, the functions of the OSS were split between the
Departments of State and War:
New Unit |
Oversight |
OSS Functions Absorbed |
Strategic Services Unit (SSU) |
War Department |
Secret Intelligence (SI) (i.e., clandestine intelligence
collection) and Counter-espionage (X-2) |
Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS) |
State Department |
Research and Analysis Branch (i.e., intelligence analysis) |
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) (not uniquely for
former OSS) |
War Department, Army General Staff |
Staff officers from Operational Groups,
Operation Jedburgh, Morale Operations (black propaganda) |
This division lasted only a few months. The first mention of the
"Central Intelligence Agency" concept and term appeared on a U.S. Army
and Navy command-restructuring proposal presented by
Jim Forrestal and
Arthur Radford to the
U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee at the end of 1945.[54]
Despite opposition from the military establishment, the
United States Department of State and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),[52]
President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in
January 1946, which was the direct predecessor to the CIA.[55]
The CIG was an interim authority established under Presidential
authority. The assets of the SSU, which now constituted a streamlined
"nucleus" of clandestine intelligence was transferred to the CIG in
mid-1946 and reconstituted as the Office of Special Operations (OSO).
Early
CIA, 1947–1952
In September 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 established both
the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency.[56]
Rear Admiral
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was appointed as the first Director of
Central Intelligence, and one of the first secret operations under him
was the successful support of the
Christian Democrats in Italy.[57]
The 16-foot (5 m) diameter CIA seal in the lobby of the
Original Headquarters Building.
The National Security Council Directive on Office of Special
Projects, June 18, 1948 (NSC 10/2) further gave the CIA the authority to
carry out covert operations "against hostile foreign states or groups or
in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned
and conducted that any U.S. government responsibility for them is not
evident to unauthorized persons."[58]
In 1949, the
Central Intelligence Agency Act (Public
law 81-110) authorized the agency to use confidential fiscal and
administrative procedures, and exempting it from most of the usual
limitations on the use of Federal funds. It also exempted the CIA from
having to disclose its "organization, functions, officials, titles,
salaries, or numbers of personnel employed." It also created the program
"PL-110", to handle defectors and other "essential aliens" who fall
outside normal immigration procedures, as well as giving those persons
cover stories and economic support.[59]
The
structure stabilizes, 1952
Then-DCI
Walter Bedell Smith, who enjoyed a special degree of Presidential
trust, having been
Dwight D. Eisenhower's primary Chief of Staff during World War II,
insisted that the CIA – or at least only one department – had to direct
the OPC and OSO. Those organizations, as well as some minor functions,
formed the euphemistically named
Directorate of Plans in 1952.[citation
needed]
Also in 1952,
United States Army Special Forces were created, with some missions
overlapping those of the Department of Plans. In general, the pattern
emerged that the CIA could borrow resources from Special Forces,
although it had its own special operators.[citation
needed]
Early Cold War, 1953–1966
Lockheed U-2 "Dragon Lady", the first generation of
near-space reconnaissance aircraft
Early CORONA/KH-4B imagery
IMINT satellite
Allen Dulles, who had been a key OSS operations officer in
Switzerland during World War II, took over from Smith, at a time where
U.S. policy was dominated by intense
anticommunism. Various sources existed, the most visible being the
investigations and abuses of Senator
Joseph McCarthy, and the more quiet but systematic
containment doctrine developed by
George Kennan, the
Berlin Blockade and the
Korean War. Dulles enjoyed a high degree of flexibility, as his
brother,
John Foster Dulles, was simultaneously Secretary of State.[citation
needed]
Concern regarding the Soviet Union and the difficulty of getting
information from its closed society, which few agents could penetrate,
led to solutions based on advanced technology. Among the first success
was with the Lockheed U-2 aircraft, which could take pictures and
collect electronic signals from an altitude thought to be above Soviet
air defenses' reach. After
Gary Powers was shot down by an SA-2 surface to air missile in 1960,
causing an
international incident, the
SR-71 was developed to take over this role.[citation
needed]
During this period, there were numerous covert actions against
left-wing movements perceived as communist. The CIA overthrew a foreign
government for the first time during the
1953 Iranian coup d'état, at the request of
Winston Churchill. Some of the largest operations were aimed at
Cuba after
the overthrow of the
Batista dictatorship, including assassination attempts against
Fidel Castro and the failed
Bay of Pigs Invasion. There have been suggestions that the Soviet
attempt to put missiles into Cuba came, indirectly, when they realized
how badly they had been compromised by a U.S.-UK defector in place,
Oleg Penkovsky.[60]
The CIA, working with the military, formed the joint National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to operate reconnaissance aircraft such as
the SR-71 and later satellites. "The fact of" the United States
operating reconnaissance satellites, like "the fact of" the existence of
NRO, was highly classified for many years.[citation
needed]
One of the biggest operations ever undertaken by the CIA was directed
at
Zaïre in support of
Mobutu Sese Seko.[61]
Indochina and the Vietnam War (1954–1975)
The OSS Patti mission arrived in
Vietnam
near the end of World War II, and had significant interaction with the
leaders of many Vietnamese factions, including
Ho Chi Minh.[62]
While the Patti mission forwarded Ho's proposals for phased
independence, with the French or even the United States as the
transition partner, the US policy of
containment opposed forming any government that was communist in
nature.
The first CIA mission to
Indochina, under the code name
Saigon Military Mission arrived in 1954, under
Edward Lansdale. U.S.-based analysts were simultaneously trying to
project the evolution of political power, both if the scheduled
referendum chose merger of the North and South, or if the South, the
U.S. client, stayed independent. Initially, the
US focus in Southeast Asia was on
Laos, not
Vietnam.
During the period of U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam War,
there was considerable argument about progress among the Department of
Defense under
Robert McNamara, the CIA, and, to some extent, the intelligence
staff of
Military Assistance Command Vietnam.[63]
In general, the military was consistently more optimistic than the CIA.
Sam Adams, a junior CIA analyst with responsibilities for estimating
the actual damage to the enemy, eventually resigned from the CIA, after
expressing concern to Director of Central Intelligence
Richard Helms with estimates that were changed for interagency and
White House political reasons. Adams afterward wrote the book
War of Numbers.
Abuses of CIA authority, 1970s–1990s
Things came to a head in the mid-1970s, around the time of
Watergate. A dominant feature of political life during that period
were the attempts of Congress to assert oversight of the U.S. Presidency
and the executive branch of the U.S. government. Revelations about past
CIA activities, such as assassinations and attempted assassinations of
foreign leaders (most notably Fidel Castro and Rafael Trujillo) and
illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, provided the opportunities to
increase Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence operations.[64]
Hastening the CIA's fall from grace were the burglary of the
Watergate headquarters of the Democratic Party by ex-CIA agents, and
President
Richard Nixon's subsequent attempt to use the CIA to impede the
FBI's investigation of the burglary. In the famous "smoking gun"
recording that led to President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his
chief of staff,
H. R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of
Watergate would "open the whole can of worms" about the Bay of
Pigs Invasion of Cuba.[65]
In this way Nixon and Haldemann ensured that the CIA's No. 1 and No. 2
ranking officials,
Richard Helms and
Vernon Walters, communicated to FBI Director
L. Patrick Gray that the FBI should not follow the money trail from
the burglars to the
Committee to Re-elect the President, as it would uncover CIA
informants in Mexico. The FBI initially agreed to this due to a
long-standing agreement between the FBI and CIA not to uncover each
other's sources of information. Though within a couple of weeks the FBI
demanded this request in writing, and when no such formal request came,
the FBI resumed its investigation into the money trail. Nonetheless,
when the smoking gun tapes were made public, damage to the public's
perception of CIA's top officials, and thus to the CIA as a whole, could
not be avoided.[66]
In 1973, then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
James R. Schlesinger commissioned reports – known as the "Family
Jewels" – on illegal activities by the Agency. In December 1974,
investigative journalist
Seymour Hersh broke the news of the "Family Jewels" (after it was
leaked to him by DCI
William Colby) in a front-page article in The New York Times,
claiming that the CIA had assassinated foreign leaders, and had
illegally conducted surveillance on some 7,000 U.S. citizens involved in
the antiwar movement (Operation
CHAOS).[64]
The CIA had also experimented on people, who unknowingly took
LSD (among other things).[64]
Congress responded to the disturbing charges in 1975, investigating
the CIA in the Senate via the
Church Committee, chaired by Senator
Frank Church (D-Idaho), and in the House of Representatives via the
Pike Committee, chaired by Congressman
Otis Pike (D-NY).[64]
In addition, President
Gerald Ford created the
Rockefeller Commission,[64]
and issued an executive order prohibiting the assassination of foreign
leaders.
During the investigation, Schlesinger's successor as DCI,
William Colby, testified before Congress on 32 occasions in 1975,
including about the "Family Jewels".[67]
Colby later stated that he believed that providing Congress with this
information was the correct thing to do, and ultimately in the CIA's own
interests.[68]
As the CIA fell out of favor with the public, Ford assured Americans
that his administration was not involved: "There are no people presently
employed in the White House who have a relationship with the CIA of
which I am personally unaware."[64]
Repercussions from the
Iran-Contra affair arms smuggling scandal included the creation of
the
Intelligence Authorization Act in 1991. It defined covert operations
as secret missions in geopolitical areas where the U.S. is neither
openly nor apparently engaged. This also required an authorizing chain
of command, including an official, presidential finding report and the
informing of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, which, in
emergencies, requires only "timely notification."
2004, DNI takes over CIA top-level functions
The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the
office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who took over some of the
government and intelligence community (IC)-wide functions that had
previously been the CIA's. The DNI manages the United States
Intelligence Community and in so doing it manages the
intelligence cycle. Among the functions that moved to the DNI were
the preparation of estimates reflecting the consolidated opinion of the
16 IC agencies, and preparation of briefings for the president. On July
30, 2008,
President Bush issued
Executive Order 13470[69]
amending
Executive Order 12333 to strengthen the role of the DNI.[70]
Previously, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) oversaw the
Intelligence Community, serving as the president's principal
intelligence advisor, additionally serving as head of the CIA. The DCI's
title now is "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" (D/CIA),
serving as head of the CIA.
Currently, the CIA reports to the Director of National Intelligence.
Prior to the establishment of the DNI, the CIA reported to the
President, with informational briefings to congressional committees. The
National Security Advisor is a permanent member of the National
Security Council, responsible for briefing the President with pertinent
information collected by all U.S. intelligence agencies, including the
National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, etc. All
16 Intelligence Community agencies are under the authority of the
Director of National Intelligence.
Al-Qaeda and the "Global War on Terrorism"
The CIA had long been dealing with terrorism originating from abroad,
and in 1986 had set up a
Counterterrorist Center to deal specifically with the problem. At
first confronted with secular terrorism, the Agency found
Islamist terrorism looming increasingly large on its scope.
In January 1996, the CIA created an experimental "virtual station,"
the
Bin Laden Issue Station, under the Counterterrorist Center, to track
Bin Laden's developing activities. Al-Fadl, who defected to the CIA in
spring 1996, began to provide the Station with a new image of the Al
Qaeda leader: he was not only a terrorist financier, but a terrorist
organizer, too. FBI Special Agent Dan Coleman (who together with his
partner Jack Cloonan had been "seconded" to the Bin Laden Station)
called him Qaeda's "Rosetta
Stone".[71]
In 1999, CIA chief George Tenet launched a grand "Plan" to deal with
al-Qaeda. The Counterterrorist Center, its new chief
Cofer Black and the center's
Bin Laden unit were the Plan's developers and executors. Once it was
prepared Tenet assigned CIA intelligence chief
Charles E. Allen to set up a "Qaeda cell" to oversee its tactical
execution.[72]
In 2000, the CIA and
USAF jointly ran a series of flights over Afghanistan with a small
remote-controlled reconnaissance drone, the
Predator; they obtained probable photos of Bin Laden. Cofer Black
and others became advocates of arming the Predator with missiles to try
to assassinate Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. After the
Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4,
2001, the CIA resumed reconnaissance flights, the drones now being
weapons-capable.
The CIA set up a
Strategic Assessments Branch in 2001 to remedy the deficit of
"big-picture" analysis of al-Qaeda, and apparently to develop targeting
strategies. The branch was formally set up in July 2001, but it
struggled to find personnel. The branch's head took up his job on
September 10, 2001.[73][74][75]
After 9/11, the CIA came under criticism for not having done enough
to prevent the attacks. Tenet rejected the criticism, citing the
Agency's planning efforts especially over the preceding two years. He
also considered that the CIA's efforts had put the Agency in a position
to respond rapidly and effectively to the attacks, both in the "Afghan
sanctuary" and in "ninety-two countries around the world".[76]
The new strategy was called the "Worldwide
Attack Matrix".
Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American U.S. citizen and al-Qaeda member,
was killed on September 30, 2011, by an air attack carried out by the
Joint Special Operations Command. After several days of surveillance of
Awlaki by the Central Intelligence Agency, armed
drones took off from a new, secret American base in the Arabian
Peninsula, crossed into northern Yemen, and unleashed a barrage of
Hellfire missiles at al-Awlaki's vehicle.
Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American al-Qaeda member and editor of the
jihadist
Inspire magazine, also reportedly died in the attack. The
combined CIA/JSOC drone strike was the first in Yemen since 2002 – there
have been others by the military’s Special Operations forces – and was
part of an effort by the spy agency to duplicate in Yemen the covert war
which has been running in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[77][78]
2003 War in Iraq
Whether or not the intelligence available, or presented by the
Bush Administration justified the
2003 invasion of Iraq or allowed proper planning, especially for the
occupation, is quite controversial.[79]
However, there were more than one CIA employee that asserted the sense
that Bush administration officials placed undue pressure on CIA analysts
to reach certain conclusions that would support their stated policy
positions with regard to Iraq.[80]
CIA
Special Activities Division paramilitary teams were the first teams
in Iraq arriving in July 2002. Once on the ground they prepared the
battle space for the subsequent arrival of
U.S. military forces. SAD teams then combined with
U.S. Army Special Forces (on a team called the Northern Iraq Liaison
Element or NILE).[81]
This team organized the
Kurdish
Peshmerga for the subsequent U.S.-led invasion. They combined to
defeat
Ansar al-Islam, an ally of Al-Qaeda. If this battle had not been as
successful as it was, there would have been a considerable hostile force
behind the U.S./Kurdish force in the subsequent assault on Saddam's
Army. The U.S. side was carried out by Paramilitary Operations Officers
from SAD/SOG and the Army's
10th Special Forces Group.[81][82][83]
SAD teams also conducted high-risk special reconnaissance missions
behind Iraqi lines to identify senior leadership targets. These missions
led to the initial strikes against
Saddam Hussein and his key generals. Although the initial strike
against Hussein was unsuccessful in killing the dictator, it was
successful in effectively ending his ability to command and control his
forces. Other strikes against key generals were successful and
significantly degraded the command's ability to react to and maneuver
against the U.S.-led invasion force.[81][84]
NATO member
Turkey
refused to allow its territory to be used by the U.S. Army's 4th
Infantry Division for the invasion. As a result, the SAD, U.S. Army
Special Forces joint teams and the Kurdish Peshmerga were the entire
northern force against Saddam's Army during the invasion. Their efforts
kept the 1st and 5th Corps of the Iraqi Army in place to defend against
the Kurds rather than their moving to contest the coalition force coming
from the south. This combined U.S. Special Operations and Kurdish force
soundly defeated Saddam's Army, a major military success, similar to the
victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan.[81]
Four members of the SAD/SOG team received CIA's rare
Intelligence Star for their "heroic actions."[85]
Operation
Neptune Spear
On May 1, 2011, President Barack Obama announced that
Osama bin Laden was
killed earlier that day by "a small team of Americans" operating in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, during a CIA operation.[86][87]
The raid was executed from a CIA forward base in Afghanistan by elements
of the U.S. Navy's
Naval Special Warfare Development Group and CIA paramilitary
operatives.[88]
It resulted in the acquisition of extensive intelligence on the
future attack plans of al-Qaeda.[89][90][91]
The operation was a result of years of intelligence work that included
the CIA's capture and interrogation of Khalid Sheik Mohammad (KSM),
which led to the identity of a courier of Bin Laden's,[92][93][94]
the tracking of the courier to the compound by
Special Activities Division paramilitary operatives and the
establishing of a CIA safe house to provide critical tactical
intelligence for the operation.[95][96][97]
Open Source
Intelligence
Until the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community, one of
the "services of common concern" that the CIA provided was
Open Source Intelligence from the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).[98]
FBIS, which had absorbed the Joint Publication Research Service, a
military organization that translated documents,[99]
which moved into the
National Open Source Enterprise under the Director of National
Intelligence.
The CIA still provides a variety of unclassified maps and reference
documents both to the intelligence community and the public.[100]
During the
Reagan administration,
Michael Sekora (assigned to the
DIA), worked with agencies across the intelligence community,
including the CIA, to develop and deploy a technology-based competitive
strategy system called
Project Socrates. Project Socrates was designed to utilize open
source intelligence gathering almost exclusively. The technology-focused
Socrates system supported such programs as the
Strategic Defense Initiative in addition to private sector projects.[101][102]
As part of its mandate to gather intelligence, the CIA is looking
increasingly online for information, and has become a major consumer of
social media. "We're looking at YouTube, which carries some unique
and honest-to-goodness intelligence," said
Doug Naquin, director of the DNI
Open Source Center (OSC) at CIA headquarters. "We're looking at chat
rooms and things that didn't exist five years ago, and trying to stay
ahead."[103]
Outsourcing and privatization
Many of the duties and functions of Intelligence Community
activities, not the CIA alone, are being outsourced and privatized.
Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence, was about
to publicize an investigation report of outsourcing by U.S. intelligence
agencies, as required by Congress.[104]
However, this report was then classified.[105][106]
Hillhouse speculates that this report includes requirements for the CIA
to report:[105][107]
- different standards for government employees and contractors;
- contractors providing similar services to government workers;
- analysis of costs of contractors vs. employees;
- an assessment of the appropriateness of outsourced activities;
- an estimate of the number of contracts and contractors;
- comparison of compensation for contractors and government
employees,
- attrition analysis of government employees;
- descriptions of positions to be converted back to the employee
model;
- an evaluation of accountability mechanisms;
- an evaluation of procedures for "conducting oversight of
contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of criminal
violations, financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by
contractors or contract personnel"; and
- an "identification of best practices of accountability
mechanisms within service contracts."
According to investigative journalist
Tim Shorrock:
...what we have today with the intelligence business is something
far more systemic: senior officials leaving their national security
and counterterrorism jobs for positions where they are basically
doing the same jobs they once held at the CIA, the NSA and other
agencies — but for double or triple the salary, and for profit. It's
a privatization of the highest order, in which our collective memory
and experience in intelligence — our crown jewels of spying, so to
speak — are owned by corporate America. Yet, there is essentially no
government oversight of this private sector at the heart of our
intelligence empire. And the lines between public and private have
become so blurred as to be nonexistent.[108][109]
Congress has required an outsourcing report by March 30, 2008.[107]
The Director of National Intelligence has been granted the
authority to increase the number of positions (FTEs) on elements in
the Intelligence Community by up to 10% should there be a
determination that activities performed by a contractor should be
done by a US government employee."[107]
Part of the contracting problem comes from Congressional restrictions
on the number of employees in the IC. According to Hillhouse, this
resulted in 70% of the de facto workforce of the CIA's National
Clandestine Service being made up of contractors. "After years of
contributing to the increasing reliance upon contractors, Congress is
now providing a framework for the conversion of contractors into federal
government employees—more or less."[107]
As with most government agencies, building equipment often is
contracted. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responsible for
the development and operation of airborne and spaceborne sensors, long
was a joint operation of the CIA and the United States Department of
Defense. NRO had been significantly involved in the design of such
sensors, but the NRO, then under DCI authority, contracted more of the
design that had been their tradition, and to a contractor without
extensive reconnaissance experience,
Boeing.
The next-generation satellite
Future Imagery Architecture project "how does heaven look", which
missed objectives after $4 billion in cost overruns, was the result of
this contract.[110][111]
Some of the cost problems associated with intelligence come from one
agency, or even a group within an agency, not accepting the
compartmented security practices for individual projects, requiring
expensive duplication.[112]
Controversies
Major sources for this section include the
Council on Foreign Relations of the United States series, the
National Security Archive and
George Washington University, the
Freedom of Information Act Reading Room at the CIA, U.S.
Congressional hearings, and books by
William Blum[113]
and Tim Weiner.[19]
Note that the CIA has responded to the claims made in Weiner's book,[114]
and that Jeffrey Richelson of the National Security Archive has also
been critical of it.[115]
Areas of controversy about inappropriate, often illegal actions
include
experiments, without consent, on human beings to explore chemical
means of eliciting information or disabling people. Another area
involved
torture and clandestine imprisonment. There have been
attempted assassinations under CIA orders and support for assassinations
of foreign leaders by citizens of the leader's country, and, in a
somewhat different legal category that may fall under the customary laws
of war, assassinations of militant leaders.
Extraordinary rendition is the apprehension and
extrajudicial transfer of a person from one country to another.[116]
The term "torture by proxy" is used by some critics to describe
situations in which the CIA[117][118][119][120]
and other US agencies have transferred suspected terrorists to countries
known to employ
torture,
whether they meant to enable torture or not. It has been claimed,
though, that torture has been employed with the knowledge or
acquiescence of US agencies (a transfer of anyone to anywhere for the
purpose of torture is a violation of US law), although
Condoleezza Rice (then the
United States Secretary of State) stated that:[121]
“the United States has not transported anyone, and will not
transport anyone, to a country when we believe he will be tortured.
Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that
transferred persons will not be tortured."
Whilst the Obama administration has tried to distance itself from
some of the harshest counterterrorism techniques, it has also said that
at least some forms of renditions will continue.[122]
Currently the administration continues to allow rendition only "to a
country with jurisdiction over that individual (for prosecution of that
individual)" when there is a diplomatic assurance "that they will not be
treated inhumanely."[123][124]
The US programme has also prompted several official investigations in
Europe into alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers
involving
Council of Europe member states. A
June 2006 report from the Council of Europe estimated 100 people had
been kidnapped by the CIA on EU territory (with the cooperation of
Council of Europe members), and rendered to other countries, often after
having transited through secret detention centres ("black
sites") used by the CIA, some located in Europe. According to the
separate
European Parliament report of February 2007, the CIA has conducted
1,245 flights, many of them to destinations where suspects could face
torture, in violation of article 3 of the
United Nations Convention Against Torture.[125]
Following the
11 September 2001 attacks the United States, in particular the
CIA, has been accused of rendering hundreds of people suspected by
the government of being terrorists—or of aiding and abetting terrorist
organisations—to third-party states such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and
Uzbekistan. Such "ghost
detainees" are kept outside
judicial oversight, often without ever entering US territory, and
may or may not ultimately be devolved to the custody of the United
States.[126][127]
On October 4, 2001, a secret arrangement is made in Brussels, by all
members of NATO.
Lord George Robertson, British defence secretary and later NATO’s
secretary-general, will later explain NATO members agree to provide
“blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other allies’
aircraft for military flights related to operations against terrorism.”[128]
Security and counterintelligence failures
While the names change periodically, there are two basic security
functions to protect the CIA and its operations. There is an Office of
Security in the Directorate for Support, which is responsible for
physical security of the CIA buildings, secure storage of information,
and personnel
security clearances. These are directed inwardly to the agency
itself.
In what is now the National Clandestine Service, there is a
counterintelligence function, called the Counterintelligence Staff
under its most controversial chief,
James Jesus Angleton. This function has roles including looking for
staff members that are providing information to foreign intelligence
services (FIS) as
moles. Another role is to check proposals for recruiting foreign
HUMINT assets, to see if these people have any known ties to FIS and
thus may be attempts to penetrate CIA to learn its personnel and
practices, or as a provocateur, or other form of
double agent.
This agency component may also launch
offensive counterespionage, where it attempts to interfere with FIS
operations. CIA officers in the field often have assignments in
offensive counterespionage as well as clandestine intelligence
collection.
Security failures
The "Family Jewels" and other documents reveal that the Office of
Security violated the prohibition of CIA involvement in domestic law
enforcement, sometimes with the intention of assisting police
organizations local to CIA buildings.
On December 30, 2009, a suicide attack occurred in the
Forward Operating Base Chapman attack, a major CIA base in the
province of
Khost, Afghanistan. Seven CIA officers, including the chief of the
base, were killed and six others seriously wounded in the attack. The
CIA is consequently conducting an investigation into how the suicide
bomber managed to avoid the base's security measures.[129]
Counterintelligence failures
Perhaps the most disruptive period involving counterintelligence was
James Jesus Angleton's search for a mole,[130]
based on the statements of a Soviet defector,
Anatoliy Golitsyn. A second defector,
Yuri Nosenko, challenged Golitsyn's claims, with the two calling one
another Soviet double agents.[131]
Many CIA officers fell under career-ending suspicion; the details of the
relative truths and untruths from Nosenko and Golitsyn may never be
released, or, in fact, may not be fully understood. The accusations also
crossed the Atlantic to the British intelligence services, who also were
damaged by molehunts.[132]
On February 24, 1994, the agency was rocked by the arrest of 31-year
veteran case officer
Aldrich Ames on charges of spying for the Soviet Union since 1985.[133]
Other defectors have included
Edward Lee Howard,
David Henry Barnett, both field operations officers, and
William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA 24-hour Operations
Center. Kampiles sold the Soviets the detailed operational manual for
the
KH-11 reconnaissance satellite.[134]
Failures in intelligence analysis
The agency has also been criticized by some for ineffectiveness as an
intelligence gathering agency. Former DCI Richard Helms commented, after
the end of the Cold War, "The only remaining superpower doesn't have
enough interest in what's going on in the world to organize and run an
espionage service."[135]
The CIA has come under particular criticism for failing to predict the
collapse of the Soviet Union.[citation
needed]
See the
information technology section of the intelligence analysis
management for discussion of possible failures to provide adequate
automation support to analysts, and
A-Space
for a IC-wide program to collect some of them.
Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis also goes into areas where
CIA has examined why analysis can fail.
Agency veterans, such as
John McLaughlin, who was deputy director and acting director of
central intelligence from October 2000 to September 2004 have lamented
CIA's inability to produce the kind of long-range strategic intelligence
that it once did in order to guide policymakers. McLaughlin notes that
CIA is drowned by demands from the White House and Pentagon for instant
information, and said, "intelligence analysts end up being the Wikipedia
of Washington."[136]
In the intelligence analysis article,
orienting oneself to the consumers deals with some of ways in which
intelligence can become more responsive to the needs of policymakers.
For the media, the failures are most newsworthy. A number of
declassified National Intelligence Estimates do predict the behavior of
various countries, but not in a manner attractive to news, or, most
significantly, not public at the time of the event. In its operational
role, some successes for the CIA include the U-2 and SR-71 programs, and
anti-Soviet
operations in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.
Among the first analytic failures, before the CIA had its own
collection capabilities, it assured President Harry S. Truman on October
13, 1950 that the Chinese would not send troops to Korea. Six days
later, over one million Chinese troops arrived.[137]
See
an analysis of the failure
-
[138] also see surrounding text for the two Koreas and
China, and the time period before the Korean War. Earlier, the
intelligence community failed to detect the North Korean invasion,
in part because resources were not allocated to
SIGINT coverage of the Korean peninsula.
The history of U.S. intelligence, with respect to French Indochina
and then the two Vietnams, is long and complex. The
Pentagon Papers often contain pessimistic CIA analyses that
conflicted with White House positions. It does appear that some
estimates were changed to reflect Pentagon and White House views.[63]
See
CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific for detailed discussions of
intelligence and covert operations from 1945 (i.e., before the CIA)
onwards.
Another criticism is the failure to predict
India's nuclear tests in 1974. A review of the various analyses of
India's nuclear program did predict some aspects of the test, such
as a 1965 report saying, correctly, that if India did develop a bomb, it
would be explained as "for peaceful purposes".
A major criticism is failure to forestall the
September 11 attacks. The
9/11 Commission Report identifies failures in the IC as a whole. One
problem, for example, was the FBI failing to "connect the dots" by
sharing information among its decentralized field offices. The report,
however, criticizes both CIA analysis, and impeding their investigation.
The executive summary of a report which was released by the office of
CIA Inspector General John Helgerson on August 21, 2007 concluded that
former DCI
George Tenet failed to adequately prepare the agency to deal with
the danger posed by
Al-Qaeda prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The report had
been completed in June 2005 and was partially released to the public in
an agreement with Congress, over the objections of current DCI General
Michael Hayden. Hayden said its publication would "consume time and
attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed."[139]
Tenet disagreed with the report's conclusions, citing his planning
efforts vis-à-vis al-Qaeda, particularly from 1999.[140]
Human rights
concerns
The CIA has been called into question on several occasions for some
of the tactics it employs to carry out its missions. At times these
tactics have included torture, funding and
training of groups and organizations that would later participate in
killing of civilians and other non-combatants and would try or succeed
in overthrowing democratically elected governments, human
experimentation, and
targeted killings and assassinations.
The CIA has been criticized for ineffectiveness in its basic mission
of intelligence gathering. A variant of this criticism is that
allegations of misconduct are symptomatic of lack of attention to basic
mission in the sense that controversial actions, such as assassination
attempts and human rights violations, tend to be carried out in
operations that have little to do with intelligence gathering. The CIA
has been charged with having more than 90% of its employees living and
working within the United States, rather than in foreign countries,
which is in violation of its charter. The CIA has also been accused of a
lack of financial and whistleblower controls which has led to waste and
fraud.[141]
External investigations and document releases
At various times since the creation of the CIA, the U.S. government
has produced comprehensive reports on CIA actions that marked historical
watersheds in how CIA went about trying to fulfill its vague charter
purposes from 1947. These reports were the result of
internal/presidential studies, external investigations by Congressional
committees or other arms of the US Government, or even the simple
releases and declassification of large quantities of documents by the
CIA.
Several investigations (e.g., the Church Committee, Rockefeller
Commission, Pike Committee, etc.), as well as released declassified
documents, reveal that the CIA, at times, operated outside its charter.
In some cases, such as during Watergate, this may have been due to
inappropriate requests by White House staff. In other cases, there was a
violation of Congressional intent, such as the Iran-Contra affair. In
many cases, these reports provide the only official discussion of these
actions available to the public.[142]
Influencing public opinion and law enforcement
The CIA has much popular agreement in a set few instances wherein it
has acted inappropriately, such as in providing technical support to
White House operatives conducting both political and security
investigations, with no reputed legal authority to do so. In many cases,
ambiguity existing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies may
expose a clandestine operation. This is a problem not unique to
intelligence but also seen among different law enforcement
organizations, where one wants to prosecute and another to continue
investigations, perhaps reaching higher levels in a conspiracy.[143]
Drug trafficking
Two offices of
CIA Directorate of Intelligence have analytical responsibilities in
this area. The Office of Transnational Issues[33]
applies unique functional expertise to assess existing and emerging
threats to U.S. national security and provides the most senior U.S.
policymakers, military planners, and law enforcement with analysis,
warning, and crisis support.
CIA Crime and Narcotics Center[34]
researches information on international narcotics trafficking and
organized crime for policymakers and the law enforcement community.
Since CIA has no domestic police authority, it sends its analytic
information to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other law enforcement
organizations, such as the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
United States Department of the Treasury (OFAC).
Another part of CIA, the National Clandestine Service, collects human
intelligence (HUMINT) in these areas.
Research by Dr.
Alfred W. McCoy,
Gary
Webb, and others has pointed to CIA involvement in narcotics
trafficking across the globe, although the CIA officially denies such
allegations.[144][145]
During the Cold War, when numerous soldiers participated in transport of
Southeast Asian heroin to the United States by the airline
Air America[citation
needed], the CIA's role in such traffic was
reportedly rationalized as "recapture" of related profits to prevent
possible enemy control of such assets.
Lying to Congress
Former Speaker of the
United States House of Representatives
Nancy Pelosi has stated that the CIA repeatedly misled the Congress
since 2001 about
waterboarding and other torture, though Pelosi admitted to being
told about the programs.[146][147]
Six members of Congress have claimed that Director of CIA
Leon Panetta admitted that over a period of several years since 2001
the CIA deceived Congress, including affirmatively lying to Congress.
Some congressmen believe that these "lies" to Congress are similar to
CIA lies to Congress from earlier periods.[148]
Covert programs hidden from Congress
On July 10, 2009, House Intelligence subcommittee Chairwoman
Representative
Jan Schakowsky (D, IL) announced the termination of an unnamed CIA
covert program described as "very serious" in nature which had been kept
secret from Congress for eight years.[149]
"It's not as if this was an oversight and over the years it
just got buried. There was a decision under several
directors of the CIA and administration not to tell the
Congress."
Jan Schakowsky, Chairwoman, U.S. House of Representatives
Intelligence Subcommittee
CIA Director Panetta had ordered an internal investigation to
determine why Congress had not been informed about the covert program.
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Representative
Silvestre Reyes announced that he is considering an investigation
into alleged CIA violations of the
National Security Act, which requires with limited exception that
Congress be informed of covert activities. Investigations and Oversight
Subcommittee Chairwoman Schakowsky indicated that she would forward a
request for congressional investigation to
HPSCI Chairman Silvestre Reyes.
"Director Panetta did brief us two weeks ago—I believe it
was on the 24th of June—... and, as had been reported, did
tell us that he was told that the vice president had ordered
that the program not be briefed to the Congress."
Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence
As mandated by
Title 50 of the United States Code Chapter 15, Subchapter III, when
it becomes necessary to limit access to covert operations findings that
could affect vital interests of the U.S., as soon as possible the
President must report at a minimum to the
Gang of Eight (the leaders of each of the two parties from both the
Senate and House of Representatives, and the chairs and ranking members
of both the Senate Committee and House Committee for intelligence).[150]
The House is expected to support the 2010 Intelligence Authorization
Bill including a provision that would require the President to inform
more than 40 members of Congress about covert operations. The Obama
administration threatened to veto the final version of a bill that
included such a provision.[151][152]
On July 16, 2008 the fiscal 2009 Intelligence Authorization Bill was
approved by House majority containing stipulations that 75% of money
sought for covert actions would be held until all members of the House
Intelligence panel were briefed on sensitive covert actions. Under the
George W. Bush administration, senior advisers to the President issued a
statement indicating that if a bill containing this provision reached
the President, they would recommend that he veto the bill.[153]
The program was rumored vis-à-vis leaks made by anonymous government
officials on July 23, to be an assassinations program,[154][155]
but this remains unconfirmed. "The whole committee was stunned....I
think this is as serious as it gets," stated
Anna Eshoo, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence Community
Management, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI).
Allegations by Director Panetta indicate that details of a secret
counterterrorism program were withheld from Congress under orders from
former U.S. Vice President
Dick Cheney. This prompted Senator Feinstein and Senator
Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee to insist
that no one should go outside the law.[156]
"The agency hasn't discussed publicly the nature of the effort, which
remains classified," said agency spokesman Paul Gimigliano.[157]
The Wall Street Journal reported, citing former intelligence
officials familiar with the matter, that the program was an attempt to
carry out a 2001 presidential authorization to capture or kill
al-Qaeda operatives.[158]
Intelligence Committee investigation
On July 17, 2009, the House Intelligence Committee said it was
launching a formal investigation into the secret program.[159]
Representative Silvestre Reyes announced the probe will look into
"whether there was any past decision or direction to withhold
information from the committee".
"Is giving your kid a test in school an inhibition on his
free learning?" Holt said. "Sure, there are some people who
are happy to let intelligence agencies go about their
business unexamined. But I think most people when they think
about it will say that you will get better intelligence if
the intelligence agencies don't operate in an unexamined
fashion."
Rush Holt, Chairman, House Select Intelligence Oversight
Panel, Committee on Appropriations [160]
Congresswoman
Jan Schakowsky (D, IL), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations, who called for the investigation, stated that the
investigation was intended to address CIA failures to inform Congress
fully or accurately about four issues: C.I.A. involvement in the downing
of a missionary plane mistaken for a narcotics flight in Peru in 2001,
and two "matters that remain classified", as well as the
rumored-assassinations question. In addition, the inquiry is likely to
look at the Bush administration's program of eavesdropping without
warrants and its detention and interrogation program.[161]
U.S. Intelligence Chief Dennis Blair testified before the House
Intelligence Committee on February 3, 2010 that the U.S. intelligence
community is prepared to kill U.S. citizens if they threaten other
Americans or the United States.[162]
The
American Civil Liberties Union has said this policy is "particularly
troubling" because U.S. citizens "retain their constitutional right to
due process even when abroad." The ACLU also "expressed serious concern
about the lack of public information about the policy and the potential
for abuse of unchecked executive power."[163]
See also
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site
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War on Terror May Resemble Bush’s in Some Areas". The New
York Times. February 17, 2009. Retrieved January 2, 2010.
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unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of
Europe member states
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^ Mayer, Jane.
The New Yorker, February 14, 2005.
"Outsourcing Torture: The secret history of America's
'extraordinary rendition' program.".
Retrieved February 20, 2007.
-
^ According to
former CIA case officer
Bob Baer, "If you want a serious interrogation, you send a
prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send
them to Syria. If you want someone to
disappear—never to see them again—you send them to Egypt."
The CIA's Rendition Flights to Secret Prisons: The
Torture-Go-Round By Lila Rajiva in
CounterPunch, December 5, 2005
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^
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^
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^
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Weiner in
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^
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The New York Times. Retrieved
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^
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The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters.
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^
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^
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Further reading
- Aldrich, Richard J. (2001). The
Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence.
London: John Murray.
ISBN 0-7195-5423-3.
OCLC 46513534.
-
Andrew, Christopher (1996). For the President's Eyes Only.
HarperCollins.
ISBN 0-00-638071-9.
-
Baer, Robert (2003).
Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi
Crude. Crown.
ISBN 1-4000-5021-9.
-
Bearden, Milton; James Risen (2003). The Main Enemy: The
Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown With the KGB. Random
House.
ISBN 0-679-46309-7.
-
Johnson, Loch K. (1991). America's Secret Power: The CIA in a
Democratic Society. Oxford University Press.
ISBN 0-19-505490-3.
-
Jones, Ishmael (2010). The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's
Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture. Encounter Books.
ISBN 978-1-59403-223-3.
-
Marchetti, Victor; John D. Marks (1974).
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Knopf.
ISBN 0-394-48239-5.
-
McCoy, Alfred W. (1972).
The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. Harper Colophon.
ISBN 978-0-06-090328-2.
-
McCoy, Alfred W. (2006).
A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to
the War on Terror. New York: Owl Books (Henry Holt & Co.).
ISBN 0-8050-8248-4.
OCLC 78821099.
-
Kessler, Ronald (2003). The CIA at War: Inside the Secret
Campaign Against Terror. St. Martin's Press.
ISBN 0-312-31932-0.
- Mahle, Melissa Boyle (2004).
Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra
to 9/11. Nation Books.
ISBN 1-56025-649-4.
-
Prouty, L. Fletcher (Col. USAF, (Ret.)) (1973). The Secret
Team: The CIA and Its Allies In Control of the World. Ballantine
Books.
ISBN 0-345-23776-5.
- Ruth, Steven (2011).
My Twenty Years as a CIA Officer: It's All About The Mission.
Charleston, SC: CreateSpace.
ISBN 978-1-4565-7170-2.
- Sheymov, Victor (1993). Tower of
Secrets. U.S. Naval Institute Press.
ISBN 978-1-55750-764-8.
-
Smith, W. Thomas, Jr. (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Facts on File.
ISBN 0-8160-4667-0.
-
Turner, Stansfield (2006). Burn Before Reading: Presidents,
CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence. Hyperion.
ISBN 0-7868-8666-8.
- Wallace, Robert; Melton, H. Keith;
Schlesinger, Henry R. (2008). Spycraft: The Secret History of the
CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda. New York: Dutton.
ISBN 0-525-94980-1.
OCLC 182552888.
- Weiner, Tim (2007).
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. New York:
Doubleday.
ISBN 0-385-51445-X.
OCLC 82367780.
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